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Summary 
This report reviews some of the basic relationships between energy, entropy, 
order, and information, especially in the context of self-organizing dissipative 
systems. It has two parts. Four general ideas are discussed in the first part: ( I )  
Information (negative entropy) can be captured and stored in dissipative struc- 
tures, including living organisms. (2) "Evolutionary level" can be usefully 
defined as the ability of living organisms to capture and store information in 
structures. This is a variant of Lotka's principle. It is further suggested (3) that 
intelligence can be defined as the ability to  modify or create ezternal (nonliving) 
structures capable of storing information. It is also suggested (4) that informa- 
tion may be stored in two forms: (a) as "free energy" and (b) as structure (mor- 
phological differentiation) per se. 
The report then focuses on the economic system as a self-organizing dissi- 
pative system in which intelligent activity (accumulation) of information-storing 
structures is more and more consciously controlled and managed. The main 
agent of negentropic accumulation is technology, generated endogenously by the 
economic system or adapted by it. The fundamental role of technological change 
as a driver of economic growth is emphasized, as is the increasing degree to  
which change and growth are intentionally managed. This trend also creates 
new vulnerabilities. 

Foreword 
The author is deputy leader of II,2SA's Technology-Economy-Society Program. 
This constitutes the third (in chronological order) of a series of his Research 
Reports exploring information-theoretic perspectives on economic issues. 
Whereas the first two papers in this set focused on specific problems, this one 
essentially proposes a new paradigm for economics. 
In brief, the author suggests that the economic system should be viewed as 
a kind of "living system" that is never in a true static equilibrium, but rather in 
a stationary (or quasi-stationary) state that must be maintained against dissipa- 
tive forces by a continuous input of free energy from outside the system. The 
report discusses some implications of this paradigm, and it provides a particu- 
larly lucid integration of the concepts of economics in the context of living sys- 
tems. 
ROBERT H. PRY 
Director 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
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SELF-ORGANIZATION IN BIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 
1. Introduction 
The second law of thermodynamics has been causing confusion and consterna- 
tion since it was first formulated by Clausius in 1847. Once it was clearly recog- 
nized that processes are of two distinct kinds - reversible and irreversible - and 
that entropy is unchanged in the former but increases in the latter, an evolution- 
ary principle or law of sorts was suggested for the physical universe. Clausius 
claimed in 1865 that for any closed system not in equilibrium, entropy must 
increase continuously. This is an extrapolation from the known fact that isolated 
thermodynamic systems not in equilibrium (but near it) must approach equilib- 
rium irreversibly. Thus, thermodynamic equilibrium is characterized - in fact, 
defined - as a state of maximum entropy. Since entropy in an isolated system 
never decreases (according to the second law), no such system can stray further 
from equilibrium than its original position. Many irreversible processes tend to 
push any system in the direction of thermodynamic equilibrium, unless the sys- 
tem is open and acted upon by external forces. 
The discouraging aspect of the situation is that for a closed system thermo- 
dynamic equilibrium is a changeless state in which all matter is uniformly distri- 
buted and there are no temperature or concentration differences - hence, no gra- 
dients and no structure or order. If the universe continues to  expand physically 
without limit, such an asymptotic limit might be envisioned: Nernst called it the 
"heat death" ( Wsrmetod) of the universe. It is a state of absolute uniformity 
and maximum disorder or mixing. 
Order is unavoidably a somewhat anthropomorphic concept. As the term 
is normally used, it implies sorting or separation, as opposed to mixing. A more 
general definition relates order to  long-range spatial (or momentum) correlations. 
It is important to emphasize that the term "order" is often used carelessly as a 
synonym for structure or organization (e.g., by Schriidinger, 1945). These terms 
are discussed further below. Disorder, in the sense of mixing or randomness, is 
not necessarily equivalent to  entropy, as suggested by Boltzmann (1896). It 
corresponds with entropy only in three very special (and unrepresentative) cases: 
an ideal perfect gas, a crystal at  low temperature, and isotopic mixing 
(McGlashan, 1966). 
At almost the same time the theory of thermodynamics was being 
developed, Charles Darwin formulated his theory of biological evolution by the 
mechanism of natura! selection. Notwithstanding some severe challenges from 
physicists (notably, by William Thompson, Lord Kelvin) during the riineteenth 
century [ I ] ,  Darwin's work in biology presented a clear and convincing story of 
evolution of living systems toward ever-increasing complexity and structure or 
organization, a t  least on the Earth's surface, culminating in the development of 
the human brain (Figure 1). 
Structure and organization are used here as nearly interchangeable words 
meaning morphological and/or functional specialization (or "division of labor"). 
Given the fossil record and other evidence, this trend toward increasing organi- 
zation appears indisputable. Here it must be pointed out that order, in the sense 
of separation, is not necessarily the same as organization, in the sense of speciali- 
zation, though the concepts are undoubtedly related. Structure definitely implies 
some sort of order, if not the converse; but for a long time it was very hard to 
reconcile Darwin's theory - or evolution itself - with the second law of thermo- 
dynamics. On the other hand, there has never been any convincing evidence of a 
definite contradiction between biological evolution and thermodynamics. 
New developments in mathematics and in nonequilibrium, nonlinear ther- 
modynamics in the past three decades have created the basis for a positive recon- 
ciliation. In particular, Glansdorff and Prigogine (1971) and Nicolis and Prigo- 
gine (1977) have constructed models of simple chemical systems that exhibit 
stable, coherent, "self-organizing" behavior, yet are far from thermodynamic 
equilibrium. Eigen (1971) has even shown convincingly how complex macro- 
molecules can not only reproduce themselves and form simple chemical building 
blocks via stable biochemical hypercycles, but can also evolve by random muta- 
tion (copying errors) and selection according to an optimization principle that is 
definable in molecular terms. 
Four decades ago, Alfred Lotka (1945) suggested that the direction of bio- 
logical evolution could be explained in terms of ability to  capture and utilize 
energy from the environment. He should have specified free energy, since only 
the component of energy that is available to do work matters. Hereafter, this 
modification is assumed: free energy is used in the general sense of availability 
for useful work. (The terms "essergy" and "exergy" have been proposed, but 
neither has achieved wide acceptance.) Intuitively, Lotka's hypothesis helps 
explain a t  least two observable aspects of biological evolution. 
(1) Organisms that use free energy (food) most efficiently will tend to compete 
most effectively, ceteris paribus, within a given niche. 
(2) Organisms have evolved to utilize any and all available sources of free 
energy, including wastes. This implies ever-increasing diversity. It 
explains the development of specialized scavengers and parasites, as well as 
the hierarchy of predators. 
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Figure 1. Intelligence on earth. The diagram gives timing, family relationsllips, and 
significant innovations in the development of terrestrial intelligence. It is likely that 
very early evolution occurred in an information carrier other than DNA. With the ad- 
vent of learned behavior in mammals and birds, DNA lost a significant part of its job. 
More than hall of what makes a modern hurnan being is passed culturally. Source: 
Moravec (1985). 
Admittedly, it was never clear whether Lotka's maximum principle 
(expressed in terms of free energy) would provide an explanation of evolution 
compatible with Darwin's principle of natural selection on the basis of "survival 
of the fittest". Unfortunately, there is a tendency to circularity in Darwin's 
theory, since "fitness" can probably only be defined in terms of ability to survive. 
In any case, the thermodynamic implications of evolution have been explored far 
more deeply in recent decades by Prigogine and his colleagues (1972), among 
others. 
2. Order, entropy and structure 
It is useful to distinguish two kinds of structure. One kind of orderly structure is 
exemplified by a crystalline solid, such as a snowflake. The  second kind of struc- 
ture occurs in systems that are stationary, but not necessarily in equilibrir~rn. 
They may, in fact, be far away from thermodynamic equilibrium and maintained 
so by a continuous renewable flow of free energy from outside the system. 
Examples range from relatively simple chemical systems, such as the "Brussela- 
tor" (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977) or the "Oregonator" (Field, 1985), to genetic 
material (Schrodinger, 1945) and living cells. A rotating gyroscope maintaining 
its dynamic equilibrium against the force of gravity offers an in+.riguing mechani- 
cal example of the same kind of phenomenon. 
For most chemical systems, and some physical systems, the concept of 
thermodynamic equilibrium is well defined and characterized by a minimum 
value of G,  the Gibbs free energy. By definition G = U + P V  - TS. (The 
Gibbs free energy is the correct measure of departure frorn equilibrium only for 
processes that take place a t  constant temperature and pressure, whence 
A G  = A U + P A  V - TAS.) The "force" driving a chemical system toward 
equilibrium are also well defined. In simple cases, this can be expressed quanti- 
tatively as a function of G. In general, the governing relationships are nonlinear. 
Nonlinear equations can have multiple discrete solutions (or even continua of 
solutions), only one of which reduces to  the solution of the linearized equation. 
This roughly describes the situation far frorn thermodynamic equilibrium, where 
there are solutions corresponding to situations where G is a t  a local - but not 
global - minimum (Glansdorff and Prigogine, 1971; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977). 
Such a local minimum may persist a t  finite temperatures and entropy 
(because of the term TS in the free energy function), but it depends on a con- 
tinuous in-flow of free energy from the environment. This cannot happen in an 
isolated system. Such persistent stable states tend to exhibit "coherent" 
behavior, which is equivalent to long-range order in phase space. Physical exam- 
ples include lasers (Graham and Haken, 1970) and thermal convection patterns 
(Velarde and Normand, 1980). The term "dissipative structure" has been 
applied by Nicolis and Prigogine (1977). Transitions from the disordered state 
to a coherent (ordered) state of a system can occur suddenly, triggered by ran- 
dom fluctuations. Such transitions between two solutions of a nonlinear 
equation have been classified topologically and termed "catastrophesn by Thorn 
(1972). 
A more recent development initiated by the work of May (1976), and since 
elaborated by a number of mathematicians (e.g., Jensen, 1987), essentially chal- 
lenges the  distinction between deterministic and random behavior. It is now 
known that  even quite simple nonlinear dynamic systems can exhibit both 
chaotic and unpredictable behavior and regular behavior for certain ranges of 
parametric values. Chaotic behavior has been defined as the behavior of deter- 
ministic dynamic systems whose solutions are extremely sensitive t o  initial condi- 
tions, such that  two trajectories started a t  nearby initial conditions diverge a t  an 
exponential ra te  called the "average Liaponov exponentn or  the  Kolmogorov- 
Sinai entropy (ibid.). 
As the  parameters of the nonlinear dynamic system vary, the transition 
between regularity and chaos is characterized by regions of chaotic behavior gra- 
dually expanding until they occupy most of the phase space of possible solutions. 
Nevertheless, under certain conditions even a chaotic dynamic system will spend 
most of its t ime in one (or more) particular region(s) in phase space. Such 
regions have been given the name "strange attractorsl' (Ot t ,  1981). T h e  
relevance of all this t o  the problem of self-organization is simply that  standard 
notions of "stability" or  persistence are  too limiting: they will have to  be 
modified so  as to  be applicable in certain circumstances, even in dynamic sys- 
tems exhibiting chaotic (i.e., apparently random) behavior. 
Of course, in most complex open systems - including living systems -- ther- 
modynamic equilibrium conditions cannot be specified in explicit terms. In bio- 
logical systems, for instance, structure and organization are reflected in morpho- 
logical differentiation and functional specialization, not in simple regularities of 
the kind found in a snowflake. In such systems, thermodynamic variables may 
not be definable a t  all. It is simply assumed that  in such cases, forces driving the  
system toward equilibrium are zero a t  equilibrium and increase, in general, with 
"distance", where the  latter term is itself difficult t o  define precisely. Again the 
(unknown) equation governing reaction rates is likely to  be nonlinear, with mul- 
tiple solutions, only one of which corresponds to  the linear near-equilibrium case. 
However, detailed quantitative examples of such behavior in chemistry or  biol- 
ogy are  still quite scarce. 
As noted above, the classical notions of order in near-equilibrium vis-i-vis 
far-from-equilibrium situations are very different. Boltzmann's famous "order 
principle" (1896), relating order t o  entropy, is not generally valid and,  in any 
case, it would apply only in the near-equilibrium case (termed the  "thermo- 
dynamic branch" by Glansdorff and Prigogine). Orderliness must be defined 
independently of entropy for a self-organizing dissipative structure.  Intuitively, 
the orderliness of a structure, such as DNA molecule, is a function of its ability 
t o  contain (i.e., embody) information and t o  preserve it from destruction or con- 
tamination. Information is a well defined concept, applicable in principle t o  any 
system, including physical, chemical, biological, social, and even technological 
systems. Indeed, it offers a bridge between the various disciplines. 
3. What is information? 
Information is commonly used in three ways: (a) in the semantic sense as data;  
(b) in the pragmatic sense of knowledge; and (c) in a formal technical sense as 
the resolution of doubt or uncertainty. It must be emphasized that,  while 
knowledge is inherently an anthropocentric concept, information is technically 
defined in terms of an abstract observer. For a good recent discussion, see 
Cherry (1978). A classic reference is Shannon and Weaver (1949). 
Information in the t,hird (Shannonian) sense of the word is a function of the 
a p r i o r i  probability of selecting a given state or outcome from the universe of 
physically possible states. The more physically possible states there are, t,he 
more information is embodied in a given selectior~ or set of equivalent selections. 
The first formal definition of information H (Hartley, 1928) was given in the con- 
text of telegraphic communications. Let 
where f is the frequency with which a giver1 code element - for example, a letter 
of the alphabet expressed in Morse code - appears in a g i v e n  message. Here the 
frequency is defined naturally as 
where Z1 is the number of t.imes the code element (e.g., letter) occurs in the mes- 
sage and Zo is the total number of elements in the message. 
More generally, in a system with a large number of possible states, the 
information content is defined by Zo, the number of possible end-states of the 
system (material), and Z1 is the number of states of particular interest, assuming 
each state to be equally probable a pr ior i .  Anticipating later generalizations, the 
numbers Zo, Z1 can be estimated a t  any convenient level of detail (atomic, 
molecular, cellular, microcrystalline, etc.), sir~ce only the ratio matters. 
The constant K in (I) is a scale factor that is fixed as soon as one selects a 
unit of measurement for information. We can permanently fix K = 1 by defining 
a "bit" of information as the amount provided by the elimination of doubt 
between two equally probable outcomes. The number of bits of information 
required to  solve a problem (i.e., to decode a message) corresponds exactly to the 
minimum number of distinct binary decisions necessary to make the correct final 
choice. This is a function only of the number of possible binary choices and the 
a p r i o r i  probability of each outcorne. 
Imagine the possibilities are "cells" (for example, in a dungeon) and that  
one seeks to find a particular prisoner, known to be in one of them. Suppose the 
searcher has no other information, whence all cells can be assumed to be equally 
probable a pr ior i .  (This is, of course, a good illustration of the pragmatic use of 
the word information as knowledge.) Assume W cells in the dungeon. There are 
many alternative search strategies. The  simplest, in some sense, is sequential 
interrogation of the jailer: "Is the prisoner in cell # I ?  Cell #2? Etc." The  
searcher might be lucky and hit on the correct choice immediately or, conversely, 
he might be unlucky and not find the prisoner until the last (Wth)  question. 
These outcomes are equally probable, as noted. If this sequential strategy were 
adopted, the average (or expected) number of questions required would be W/2. 
On reflection, a much more efficient strategy is possible. The searcher 
could ask questions that reduce the number of remaining possibilities by a factor 
of 2 each time. For instance, if the cells are numbered I... W, one could ask: "Is 
the prisoner located in the subset of cells from 1 to W/2 inclusive?" Whether 
the answer is yes or no, the uncertainty is reduced by a factor of 2. If the answer 
is yes the prisoner is known to be in the first group of addresses (1,2, ... W/2); if 
the answer is no, the prisoner must be in the second half (W/2  + 1, ... W]. In 
either case, the same procedure is repeated until only two final possibilities 
remain. The  information gained by each of these questions is exactly 1 bit. The  
smallest number of such questions (or decisions) is log2 W. (Obviously, if W is 
not an even number, W/2 might not be an integer; but for large values of W, 
this complication can be ignored.) 
In the real world, one cannot always proceed quite so efficiently, because 
possible states are seldom, in fact, equally probable. For instance, consider the 
game of "Twenty Questions". Suppose I a m  thinking of a famous author, and 
you have to identify that author by asking a few questions. Possible questions 
might include 
Is the author male? 
Does his/her name begin with letters A-M (the first half of the alphabet)? 
Is the author living? 
Does (did) the author live in England? 
In all cases, the a priori probability of a yes answer is likely to be different 
from the probability of a no. For instance, considerably more than half of all 
famous authors are male and well over half have names beginning with letters in 
the first half of the alphabet. On the other hand, probably fewer than half of all 
famous authors are living. Thus, the values of yes versus no answers are unequal 
in terms of reducing uncertainty, and the information elicited by each question is 
normally either more than 1 bit or less than 1 bit, depending on the case. 
Let P, be the a priori probability of the i th  state (or event). The  informa- 
tion provided by an actual realization of that event (i.e., the answer to  the ques- 
tion is yes) is therefore 
For example, i f  314 of all "famous writers" are male, then a yes is worth 
less than 1 bit, because the number of possibilities was only cut by a factor of 
114 rather than by a factor of 112. In fact, the value of a yes in this case is 
log, (413) = 2 - log, 3 = 0.4147 bits. On the other hand, the value of a no is 
log, 4 = 2 bits! The information provided by a series of affirmative answers is 
the simple sum of their individual information values, provided the probabilities 
are truly independent of each other. For nonindependent states i, j, one must 
adjust by adding or subtracting a term representirig the information value 
corresponding to the deviation of joint probability from a simple product of pro- 
babilities. However, the assumption of independence is generally adequate for 
purposes of the discussion that follows. 
Returning for a moment to  the "Twenty Questions" example above, it was 
pointed out that  the value of a yes versus a no is generally unequal. It is there- 
fore natural to  ask: what is the probable or expected amount of information eli- 
cited by each question? Evidently, the information value of each outcome must 
be weighted by its probability, Pi. It is helpful to  note that  probabilities add up 
to  unity, viz. 
C P ,  = I ,  i = I ,...., N (4) 
C,P; log, P; 
<H> = -<log2 P,> = - = - z i p ,  log, Pi zi P, 
This expression for expected information was first introduced by Shannon 
(1948), also in the context of communications. 
As an illustration of this formula, consider the question posed above: "Is 
the famous author (I  a m  thinking of) male?" If, in fact, 314 of all famous 
authors are male, then the answer yes on my part adds 0.4147 bits of informa- 
tion to  your stock, but the answer no is worth 2 bits. But yes has a probability 
of 314, while no has a probability of 114. Thus, the expected amount of informa- 
tion to  be gained from this question is 
(314) x 0.4147 x (114) x 2 = 0.811 bits 
which is, as already pointed out, somewhat less than 1 bit. 
This way of looking a t  information opens a link with physics, via statistical 
mechanics. One may consider the case of a physical system (of atoms or 
molecules) that  is changing or evolving over time. At any moment it is in a 
definite state,  but, a t  another moment it will be in another state. Let PI be a set 
of state probabilities ( P I  > O), satisfying (4). When a definite observation is 
made, confirming that  event i (among all possible events) has occurred (i.e., the 
system is in the rth state),  the information gained by that observation is given 
by (3). But the original probability of that event (state) was only Pi. Another 
measurement might find the system in quite a different state. The ezpected 
amount of information provided by an observation of the system is the average 
value of the expression (3) over many observations, which is exactly (5). 
In reality, we have no means of observing large systems (e.g, molecules) so 
precisely that the exact state of each molecule can be determined a t  a moment in 
time. One can only say how much information would be provided by such an 
observation, on the assumption that all microstates are equally probable and 
that the total number of such microstates is W. Then the information value of 
the (hypothetical) observation would be [from equation (3)] 
However, in the more realistic case of unequal probabilities, Shannon's formula 
(5) must be used. 
It is of some interest to note that multi-component systems embody infor- 
mation in their structure. Assume a closed system of n "compartments". One of 
the compartments can always be defined, for convenience, as the external 
environment. Assume each compartment contains a "stock" of some universal 
medium (it could be railroad cars, mass-energy, or money) and there are "flows" 
between compartments. The medium is conserved in the system as a whole. Let 
T be the total throughput of the system, and T can be composed into inputs to 
the various compartments, or outputs from them. 
One can further decompose the flows into each compartment into a sum of 
flows from the other compartments and, similarly, the flow out of each compart- 
ment can be decomposed into flows to each of the others. Thus, if Tij  represents 
the flow i to j. 
The ratio T i / T  is the probability per unit time that a quantum of the 
medium will enter (or leave) the ith compartment. The joint probability that a 
quantum will flow from the ith compartment to the j t h  compartment is Tij /  T, 
and so on. It can be shown that the average total information needed to specify 
the mcompartment system is given by 
1 " 1 " H(n)  = - -C Ti log Ti - -C Tilog Ti 
Ti=l  T jzl 
I " "  + - C C Tij(log T + log Tij) 
Ti=l  j=I 
The first two terms can be interpreted as "inputn information and "output" 
information, respectively. The third term can be interpreted as informtion 
embodied in "structure". This formalism is applicable to any multi-component 
system that can be characterized as a network of flows. 
4. Information and entropy 
In point of historical fact, Shannon actually used the term entropy, rather than 
(expected) information, as his measure of uncertainty. His choice of terminology 
was apparently whimsically suggested by the mathematician John von Neumann, 
who defined information gain as the difference between the u.lceriainty prevail- 
ing before an event (e.g., receipt of a message) and the uncertainty remaining 
afterward. Using the standard notation for entropy (S) 
But (11) is merely an assertion of identity, not a proof. The relationship 
between Shannonian entropy and classical thermodynamic entropy (from Clau- 
sius) has been the center of an extended discussion, with significant contributions 
by Brillouin (1951 and 1962), Jaynes (1957a and 1957b), Khinchin (1957), and 
Tribus (1961a and 1961b). Although there are still doubters, most physicists 
now accept that information and (negative) entropy are, essentially, the same 
thing - not merely analogs. 
Boltzmann's famous statistical definition of entropy- it is inscribed on his 
tomb in Vienna - for a system of many identical particles was 
S = kln W (I2) 
where k is the Boltzmann constant (1.38 x joules/"#) and W was the 
number of possible distinct states (or complexions) of the system. For an ideal 
gas of distinguishable but quantized particles, for example, it is known that 
where N is the number of particles, V is the volume, E is the total energy of the 
system, m is the mass of a particle, j is the spin, and h is Planck's constant. For 
the macroscale, N is typically of the order of the number of molecules in a 
gram-molecular weight (or mole) of any gas at standard pressure and tempera- 
ture STP . This number is called Avogadro's number, A ,  which is equal to 6.02 1 '  x 10 3.) Taking helium gas at STP as an example, the numerical value of abso- 
lute entropy S is 28.7 cal/"K or 7.2 cal/mole8K = 30.1 joules/mole"K. 
In information terms, this is the total amount of micro-uncertainty in the 
gas volume as a whole, with respect to the states of all the molecules in it. It is 
therefore the amount of information that would be gained if all micro- 
uncertainty were removed by some hypothetical observation. By comparison, 
the potential amount of uncertainty removed (or information gained) with 
respect to a single molecule that could be in either one of two isotopic states, is 
exactly 1 bit. Using Boltzmann's formula (8), the entropy of such a system is kln 
2. 
By this logic, Brillouin determined the thermodynamic equivalent of 1 bit 
to be: 
1 bit = kln2 = 9.52 x joules/'K 
= 2.27 x cal/'K 
Thus, thermodynamic "informationn has units of energy divided by temperature. 
A flow of 1 bit of information corresponds to a very small flow of energy or a 
very small change of temperature or both. Tribus and McIrvine (1971), who 
provide a clearer explanation than Brillouin, have particularly emphasized the 
very small absolute amounts of energy required to process and deliver informa- 
tion in most communication and information-processing activities. For example, 
a TV broadcast requires about 6 joules of energy to deliver 300,000 bits of infor- 
mation, but that information has an available energy equivalent of only 1.3 
x 10-l5 joules. The rest of the 6 joules of energy is just lost to the environment. 
(Note that 1 cal = 4.186 joules.) 
Several physicists have called attention to the enormous amplification fac- 
tor implicit in the fact that small amounts of energy in the form of information 
suffice to control very large flows of energy. Allred (1977) has calculated several 
commonplace examples with power gain factors ranging from lo8 for an automo- 
bile to 1013 for a large aircraft homing on a radio beacon. For purposes of this 
paper, the interesting implications of the large amplifier effect will not be pur- 
sued further. 
The physical identification of information as negentropy suggests the possi- 
bility that stocks of information embodied in structure/organization can be 
regarded in some sense as reserves or storehouses of negative entropy. These can 
be utilized to increase the ability of dissipative open systems to capture both 
negative entropy and materials from the environment and, thus, to grow. This 
perspective will be elaborated further hereafter. 
5. Information and organization in biology 
Three related notions are suggested by the identification of information stocks 
with negative entropy. First, a dissipative structure far from equilibrium may 
itself capture and store negative entropy from its environment for future use in 
the form of more complez organization or structure. 
Second, evolutionary level can be defined, tentatively, as the ability of a liv- 
ing system to capture and store negentropy (or information) in genetic structures 
or in brains. Genetic information predominates in lower forms of life and brain 
information predominates in higher forms, as indicated in Figure 2. All living 
organisms have the ability to store information in lesser or greater degree. 
Third, intelligence can be defined as the ability to learn, to modify 
behavior, and/or to modify the external environment, i.e., to  create external 
structures (cultures and cultural artifacts) for information storage. The ability 
to modify the external environment is apparently possessed to some extent by all 
higher animals, but the ability to create external structures explicitly for infor- 
mation storage is possessed only by humans. Carl Sagan (1977) has called this 
"extra-somatic" information. Whereas Lotka's principle suggests that evolution 
seeks to  maximize the ability to process free energy, it is suggested below that 
evolution seeks to maximize the ability to  capture free energy and, most impor- 
tant, to convert some of it to  morphological information embodied as structure or 
organization. To the extent that intelligence enhances this ability, evolution 
seeks to  maximize intelligence. Yet the new perspective does not seriously 
conflict with Lotka's, inasmuch as capturing free energy also implies processing 
(i.e., metabolizing) it. 
That  organisms capture disembodied information from the environment 
and store it in physical structures has been pointed out in various ways many 
limes. The underlying notion that living organisms seem to retard the global 
increase of entropy has been frequently been expressed in the biological litera- 
ture, e.g., by Johnstone (1921), Breder (1942), Needham (1943) and Blum (1955) 
121. The idea that advancing evolutionary level corresponds to increasing struc- 
tural complexity goes back at  least to Herbert Spencer and was reiterated by 
Huxley (1956), although this notion is still questioned by some biologists. All of 
this literature was well summarized by Polgar (1961). 
The gene itself is nothing more nor less than a packet of information stored 
compactly in  molecular^ form ( S c h r ~ d i n ~ e r ,  1945). It contains both morphologi- 
cal and functional information needed by the organism. The information embod- 
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Figure 2. Genetic information. Source: Sagan (1977) 
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ied in genes tells cells how and when to divide, how and when to differentiate, 
how to manufacture various enzymes, hormones, etc. It specifies the many cou- 
pled biochemical pathways (hypercycles) that carry out the metabolic processes. 
It also tells the organism as a whole how to react to various stimuli, what food to 
eat, when and how to mate, where to lay eggs, etc. This information storehouse 
is the result of long evolutionary learning process, described by Darwin as 
natural selection and by Eigen (1971) as "value maximization". The cumulative 
nature of the process is evident from the fact that the higher organisms, arriving 
later on the evolutionary scene, carry far more genetic information than the sim- 
plest, earliest organisms (Figure 2). The ability of higher organisms to accumu- 
late and reproduce this information by extragenetic means can also be regarded 
as evidence of increasing intelligence in the sense defined above. 
Returning to the accumulation of "stored negentropy-as-structure", Polgar 
(1961) has identified four key mechanisms, viz. persistence, replication, environ- 
mental modification, and social evolution. On deeper reflection, Polgar's 
classification seems incomplete. Since self-replication and environmental 
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modification are both mechanisms for information storage and transfer, it would 
seem that self-modification (i.e., learning) might be considered as another 
category of mechanism. 
At the molecular (i.e., genetic) level, Schriidinger (1945) showed that per- 
sistence, as reflected by the low rate of natural mutation, can be explained in 
terms of quantum mechanics. The critical difference between classical and quan- 
tized systems is that the former are characterized by a continuum of possible 
states, whereas the latter are characterized by discrete states with discrete tran- 
sitions between them. At the level of chemical system, Glansdorff and Prigogine 
(1971) and Nicolis and Prigogine (1977) have given an explanation of the per- 
sistence of structure in terms of nonequilibrium thermodynamics. 
Replication is, of course, one of nature's basic long-term survival (and 
growth) mechanisms. A detailed understanding of replication a t  the cellular 
level may still be years away, but the famous discovery of the double-helix struc- 
ture of DNA and the so-called genetic code provided a very useful starting point 
(Crick, 1962). The other important natural means whereby living systems 
ensure their own long-term survival are by self-modification and environmental 
modification. The species modification process may be unconscious, as in 
Darwin's theory of natural selection, or take place at the microlevel, as postu- 
lated by Eigen (1971) and Dyson (1982). Or self-modification can be conscious, 
as in human learning processes. 
By comparison, environmental modification has received less attention, 
although it is immensely important. Living organisms have massively modified 
the atmosphere and the ocean over the past two billion years (Oparin, 1953). 
The earth's primordial atmosphere was mostly carbon dioxide (GO2) and water 
(H20) plus methane (CH*) and ammonia (NH3) with no free oxygen or nitrogen, 
while the primitive oceans were much smaller and saltier. Life as we know it 
today could not survive in such an environment. By the same token, the present 
oxygen-rich environment is quite unsuitable to the spontaneous formation of 
organic molecules by known mechanisms (e.g., Miller and Orgell, 1974). The 
driver of these environmental changes was the evolutionary development of 
increasingly efficient energy conversion mechanisms (Table 1 ) .  Whereas the ear- 
liest known organisms obtained energy by inefficient anaerobic processes akin to 
fermentation, later aerobic organisms utilized the more efficient photosynthetic 
processes (Wald, 1955; Gaffron, 1965). 
Environmental modification in some form is still practiced today at the 
microlevel by viruses (upon their host cells), by wasps that paralyze their prey 
and lay eggs in them, by every nest-building species, and on the mesolevel by 
some animals such as beavers. On a larger scale, forests and savannahs create 
their own macroenvironments. (Deforestation in the tropics can lead to irrever- 
sible desertification). Coral reefs are the undersea analog. Of course, human 
activities such as agriculture and fossil fuel consumption have enormous environ- 
mental impacts, which we need not consider here at length. 
Table 1 .  Energy conversion processes during various evolutionary eras. 
Form of Structure and 
evolution Era Environment Energy source process outcomes 
I Anaerobic; methane, Ultraviolet light; Acetate, glycine, uracil, 
ammonia, hydrogen heat adenine, other organic 
molecules in aqueous 
Loss of most free hy- medium 
drogen 
i I1 Anaerobic; traces of Ultraviolet light; Polyphosphates, por- gasenous oxygen heat; visible light phyrins, peptides; porphyrin catalysis Chemical Loss of most ultra- of photoreduction violet light and oxidation 
111 Anaerobic; traces of Visible light Replicating organic mol- 
gaseous oxogen and ecules; photochemical 
carbon dioxide reactions 
Loss of many free 
organic molecules 
C Anaerobic; gaseous Photo-reduction; Organelles; cells; two- carbon dioxide and fermentation s tep light-energy con- traces of gaseous version process oxygen 
/ Loss of most anaer- 
obic environmental 
Biological regions 
Aerobic; anaerobic Photosynthesis; Free-living cells; organs 
pockets respiration and organisms 
Source: Gaffron (1965) 
Another way in which negentropy-as-structure in the biosphere operates to 
cut down on the free energy flux per unit of biomass (and, thus, retard the rate 
of global entropy increase) is by means of species diversity and specialization. 
The key is that there are relationships between function and structure. 
Each species of plant or animal having a different function (i.e., a different niche) 
will have a different structure - hence, a different microcomposition. Each 
species can be expected to require a somewhat different combination of inputs, as 
noted by Leibig in 1876 (Lotka, 1950), so that its limiting factors will be 
different. Thus the total biomass of two species exploiting the same resource 
base can generally be larger than that of any one alone. A third species, with a 
different specialization, can add still more to the total biomass without exhaust- 
ing the available resources, and so on. 
The lowest-level trophic animals obtain their food mainly as carbohydrates 
or cellulose, directly from photosynthetic plants. Higher animals, in turn, are 
able to exploit lower animals and obtain their food mainly as proteins and fats, 
which are more useful and easier to digest. The top predators are therefore able 
to eat and digest much less bulk than they would otherwise need, by consuming 
foods more similar to their own tissues and more easily broken down into sugars 
and amino acids for reassembly. This enables active carnivores to consume more 
food (free energy), but spend much less time eating and digesting than the her- 
bivores they prey on. 
Significantly, the amount of genetic information required to reproduce an 
organism tends to increase with its trophic level in the predator-prey hierarchy. 
So, in general, does the information-processing capacity of the organism itself: 
the processing capacities of its brain and central nervous system seem to increase 
with trophic level, as shown in Figure 2. For higher mammals, the storage capa- 
city of the brain significantly exceeds the storage capacity of DNA. 
It is worthy of note that Miller (1978 and 1987) has identified 20 subsys- 
tems that appear to be characteristic of most living systems, from cells to human 
societies. Of these, 10 subsystems are primarily information processors. The 
complete list, together with some examples (given by Miller) is attached as an 
Appendix. 
A recent contribution of some importance is the observation that structural 
complexity is proportional in information-content for interactive biotic communi- 
ties or ecosystems, as well as individual organisms. 
In particular, Ulanowicz (1986) has proposed an information-based formal- 
ism [see equations (7)-(lo)] for describing biotic communities and helping to 
explain the countervailing tendencies of such systems towards increasing 
eficiency, on the one hand, and increasing resiliency on the other. Ulanowicz 
introduces a composite measure for systems called "ascendencyn. A combining 
total system throughput flow T (of nutrient or energy) and "average mutual 
informationn H in the Shannonian sense. The defining relationship is 
6. Extragenetic processes of information storage and transfer 
Humans are not the first organisms in nature to transmit nongenetic information 
from generation to generation. Most mammals and birds teach their young, to 
some degree at least. Humans are, however, the first species to store nongenetic 
information systematically as such in external repositories, such as libraries that 
are maintained by the society as a whole. The developments of spoken and, 
later, written languages were obviously critical steps. Indeed, although humans 
may have existed as a distinct biological species for several million years, the 
processes of extragenetic information storage began only about 6000 years ago, 
as shown in Table 2. Moreover, in recent centuries, cultural information accu- 
mulation and transfer, recently enhanced by the use of computers, has undoubt- 
edly approached, and possibly surpassed, the genetic transfer process, as sug- 
gested in Figure 3. 
Table 2. Evolution of external means of information transmission. 
Ideographs 
Pictographs 
Government (State)/law 
Writing (cuneiform) 
Phonograrns 
Hieroglyphics 
Dictionaries 
Book (papyrus roll) 
Archives 
University 
Library 
Multiplication tables 
Code of law 
Mail (letters) 
Fractions 
Algebra 
Alphabet 
Coinage 
Zero 
Encyclopedia 
Public education 
Telegraph 
Telephone 
Radio-telegraph 
Radio broadcast 
TV broadcast 
4000 BC 
3500 BC 
3500 BC 
3000 BC 
3000-2800 BC 
3000-2800 BC 
2800 BC 
2800 BC 
2500 BC 
2500 BC 
2500 BC 
2500 BC 
2100 BC 
2200 BC 
2000 BC 
1800 BC 
1500-1400 BC 
700 BC 
300 BC 
18th century AD 
18th century AD 
1840s 
1876 
1890s 
1922 
1928 
Surner. 
Surner. 
Surner. 
Surner. 
Surner. 
Egypt 
Surner./tablets 
Surner./Egypt 
Sumer. 
Surner. 
Surner. 
Sumer. 
Sumer. 
Surner. 
Baby Ion 
Mesopotamia 
Palestine (Phoenicians) 
Lydia 
Baby Ion 
France 
New England 
US, UK, Germany 
US 
Italy, UK 
US, UK 
US, UK 
For example, the systematic use of extragenetic information to enhance the 
food gathering and production process began in prehistoric times. Knowledge 
about plant reproduction, animal behavior, weather, climate, geography, and 
even astronomy [3) had an enormous payoff in terms of increasing the ability of a 
human population to support itself and grow in numbers. At first, much of this 
knowledge was acquired and retained by a process not dissimilar to natural selec- 
tion. More recently, the application of knowledge to increase production has 
become increasingly intentional, systematic, and analytic. As I have emphasized 
elsewhere (Ayres, 1987b), manufacturing can be regarded as the process of 
implanting "useful" information in materials. A similar notion has also been 
expressed by Berg (1987): "Production begins in the human nervous system and 
ends in the human nervous systemn. The processes of learning about nature, 
and disseminating and applying that knowledge for the benefit of man, are them- 
selves now institutionalized, as will be discussed later. 
The notion of stored information (knowledge) as an effective substitute for 
resource inputs follows immediately from the notion of using knowledge to 
increase the efficiency of capturing and accumulating "natural" information (free 
energy) from the environment. In effect, resources are created by human intelli- 
gence. Solar energy is, of course, captured by photosynthesis and stored as fossil 
Figure 3. Computers versus living systems. Source: Moravec (1981). 
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fuels, but to find and use these resources requires knowledge. The essential 
equivalence of knowledge and resources is neatly summarized by the proverb: 
"Give a man a fish, and he can feed his family for a day. Teach him how to fish, 
and he can feed his family forever." Ancient man learned how to make useful 
objects from copper, silver, iron, and other metals from nearly pure nuggets. As 
one resource is exhausted, typically, another of lower grade is exploited. Thus, 
charcoal gave way to coke, and whale oil was replaced by kerosene. To  be fair, 
the innovations that make such substitutions possible are often motivated by 
other considerations. In particular, the first distillation of petroleum to extract 
kerosene (and other by-products) was motivated by the desire to find some use 
for an abundant nuisance. ( I  am indebted to Charles Berg for this observation). 
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Knowledge also permits more efficient utilization of any resource. As the 
demand for motor gasoline grew rapidly in the early twentieth century, means of 
increasing the gasoline and octane output from each barrel of crude oil were 
actively sought. Using sophisticated modern refinery technology, and anti-knock 
additives, the gasoline recovery fraction has risen from 15% to as much as 60% 
of each barrel, while average octane levels have almost doubled from about 50 
(for natural gasoline) to over 90 in the late 1960s. This, in turn, permits higher 
engine compression ratios and correspondingly higher levels of thermal efficiency. 
Thus, technological knowledge has enormously increased the amount of useful 
transportation work that can be extracted from crude oil (Enos, 1962). It is not 
unreasonable to  attribute this enhancement to technological knowledge created 
by the techno-economic system. This system comprises both embodied 
knowledge (in capital equipment) and disembodied knowledge in various port,- 
able forms, such as books and computer software. 
A further observation regarding resources: the vast storehouse of fossil 
fuels in the earth's crust that humans are currently exploiting (and using up) is 
an accumulation of surplus natural negentropy left over from incompletely 
decayed living organisms in earlier geological periods. It is stored (from a molec- 
ular perspective) as chemical structure, i.e., energy-rich hydrocarbon molecules 
that are quite stable a t  ambient temperatures, but which combine exothermically 
with oxygen above ignition temperature. Obviously, humans will have to find 
other energy sources to replace hydrocarbons within a century, more or less. It 
is already clear that several alternative possibilities exist, including fission, 
fusion, and photovoltaic cells on the Earth or in space. However, all of them will 
require large capital (i.e., stored information) investments, not to mention tech- 
nologies more advanced than are currently available. In any case, some surplus 
negentropy in the form of capital will have to be set aside from the existing fossil 
fuel store to "finance" the eventual changeover. 
It is worth emphasizing once again that physical capital represents a store 
of useful information. The process of accumulating capital, which economists 
traditionally assurried to be the mechanism of economic growth, is evidently a 
process of a.ccumulating embodied information. The technological progress 
represented by successive generations of capital equipment is, from t,his perspec- 
tive, merely another aspect of the same accumulation process. 
7. The economic system as a self-organizing 
dissipative structure [4] 
Economists do not think of economic activities and relationships in thermo- 
dynamic terms. When economists talk about equilibrium, they refer to a balance 
between supply and demand, or (looking a t  it another way) among prices, wages, 
and profits. Neoclassical economic models consider labor, capital goods, and ser- 
vices to be abstractions. The exception is, perhaps, resource/environmental 
economics, in which some physical properties of matter (e.g., mass, toxicity) can- 
not be neglected. 
The proof of the existence of a static supply-demand equilibrium (conjec- 
tured by Walras in 1877; finally proved by Arrow and Debreu in 1951) was one 
of the great achievements of neoclassical economics because it seems to provide a 
theoretical explanation of Adam Smith's price-setting 9nvisible hand". There 
can be no question that the operation of a money-based free competitive market 
generates a kind of coherence, or long-range order, in contrast to the unstable 
price-wage anarchy that prevails in a barter society, for instance. Central plan- 
ning attempts to introduce order of another kind. The static competitive free 
market-based economic system described in textbooks does reflect a kind of order 
very similar to cooperative phenomena in physics. It has also been proved that 
an idealized market-based system tends toward a so-called Pareto optimum - a 
situation where nobody can be better off without making somebody else worse off 
- although it does not necessarily allocate resources equitably. (Equity is, of 
course, a moral concept.) Finally, the market system is, in theory, self- 
regulating and capable of recovering from a perturbation in demand, for 
instance. It therefore displays self-organizing characteristics. 
Even the abstract model of the economic system depends on resource 
inputs, but in a closed Walrasian model resources are assumed to  be generated by 
labor and capital. The neo-classical (Walrasian) equilibrium system does not 
qualify as a dissipative structure. The neoclassical system is, in effect, a per- 
petual motion machine. This fact was emphatically pointed out by the Nobel 
prize-winning chemist F. Soddy in 1922 (Daly, 1980), but Soddy's work was vir- 
tually ignored by economists. The first economists to stress the dissipative 
nature of the economic system were Boulding (1966) and Georgescu-Roegen 
(1971). The relevance of mass and energy conservation to environmental- 
resource economics was first emphasized by Kneese et al. (1970). 
In reality, resource inputs originate outside the economic system per se: 
they include air, water, sunlight and material substances, fuels, food, and fiber 
crops, all of which embody free energy or available work. "Outputs" of the 
economic system, on the other hand, are final goods. They are ultimately dis- 
carded or, in rare cases, recycled. Wastes that are not recycled are, again, out- 
side the economic system. Free energy is expended and lost at every state, viz. 
extraction, refining, manufacturing, construction, and even final consumption 
(Ayres, 1978). Though total energy is always conserved, free energy is not. 
Energy inputs (fuels) are rich in free energy, while energy outputs are mostly in 
the form of low-temperature waste heat, oxidation products, or degraded materi- 
als. Thus, the economic system, in reality, is absolutely dependent on a continu- 
ing flow of free energy from the environment. In preindustrial times, it was the 
sun that provided almost all free energy in the form of wood, food crops, 
animals, water power, or wind power. Today, the major source, by far, is fossil 
fuels: petroleum, natural gas, and coal from earth's crust. These resources are 
being exhausted, of course, and will eventually have to be replaced. 
Evidently, the real economic system looks very much like a self-organizing 
dissipative structure in Prigogine's sense: it is dependent on a continuous flow of 
free energy (the sun or fossil fuels), and it exhibits coherent, orderly behavior. 
Moreover, like living organisms, it embodies structural information as morpho- 
logical differentiation and functional specialization [5]. In economic terms, spe- 
cialization and differentiation of form and function were first recognized as the 
"division of laborn. Of course, production itself is highly differentiated into sec- 
tors, products, and services. Similarly, labor skills are increasingly subdivided 
into occupational classifications. 
To  carry the analogy with living systems a step further, economic systems 
are also capable of growth. Economic growth can be of two distinct kinds. 
First, an economic system can, in principle, expand in size, like a balloon, 
without accompanying technological or structural change. Output grows but 
structure complexity does not. It simply gets bigger, as capital and labor inputs 
increase proportionally. This kind of quasi-static growth can lead to increased 
final consumption per capita (for a stationary population) by producing more of 
everything, in exactly fixed ratios. This is only possible, however, if there are no 
economies or diseconomies of scale, which is an unrealistic but common economic 
assumption. Technological change is permitted in the quasi-static case, but only 
in the sense of gradual increases in productivity due to  "learningn. This kind of 
change is sometimes called "Usherian", in contrast to more radical "Schum- 
peterian" changes. 
The second kind of growth is dynamic: it involves revolutionary (Schum- 
peterian) changes in structure, i.e., the creation of new sectors and the obsoles- 
cence or destruction of old ones. These changes are driven by radical innova- 
tions - new products, new processes - resulting not only in quantitative increases 
in per capita consumption, but also in qualitative changes in the mix of goods 
and services generated by the economy. In general, dynamic technology-driven 
growth results in increased complexity and an increased amount of information 
stored in the form of structure/organization. Recall the earlier discussion, espe- 
cially equations (7)-(10). 
Quasi-static growth "of the first kind" can be modeled theoretically as an 
optimal control model with aggregate consumption (or welfare) as the objective 
function. The control variable is the rate of savings diverted from immediate 
consumption to replace depreciated capital and add new capital to support a 
higher level of future consumption [6]. The rate of growth in a simple model of 
this kind is directly proportional to the rate of savings, which, in turn, depends 
on the assumed depreciation rate and an assumed temporal discount rate to 
compare present versus future benefits. Note that assumptions about the opera- 
tion of the market play almost no role in this type of growth model. Savings, in 
this model, can be voluntary or enforced by government. Technological change 
is strictly exogenous. 
It is noteworthy (and unfortunate) that many economic development pro- 
grams in the Third World have been based on the generalized Harrod-Domar 
type of model, assuming growth of the first kind only. This model suggests a pri- 
mary role for aggregate capital investment and depending on central planners to 
maintain balance between the capital needs of various sectors 171. Yet, empirical 
research carried out as early as the 1950s established quite clearly that per capita 
economic growth in the USA and other industrial countries cannot be accounted 
for primarily in terms of increased capital inputs, e.g., Abramovitz (1956), Fabri- 
cant (1954), and Solow (1957). In fact, the linked notion of increasing factor 
productivity as a reflection of technological progress was introduced into 
economics a.t this time by Kendrick (1956). Unfortunately, the relative contribu- 
tion of Usherian (incremental) vs. Schumpeterian (radical) innovation was not 
clarified by these early studies. However, the relatively poor performance of 
most centrally planned economic development programs is probably due in part 
t,o their focus on investment per se, to the neglect of parallel structural adjust- 
ment and radical innovation. 
Dynamic growth "of the second kind" is less dependent on savings and/or 
capital investment and far more dependent on R&D and innovation. However, 
such growth cannot occur without capital investment since new production tech- 
nologies, in particular, are largely embodied in capital equipment. Technological 
innovation drives this kind of dynamic growth, as will be discussed later. 
An essential characteristic of self-organizing systems seems to be feedback 
control, e.g., Lotka (1950), Nicolis and Prigogine (1977), and Odum (1983). 
This applies not only to stabilization processes, but also to growth 
processes. Feedback controls in complex systems involve information transfer. 
In biological organisms there are a number of specialized physical and chemical 
subsystems for monitoring the state-of-the-environment and the state-of-the- 
system and responding to changes in either. 
In the economic system the same thing is true. In an idealized free-market 
economy, the "signals" are market prices. In an idealized centrally and planned 
economy, the necessary control information must be derived by administrative 
rneans (from data on production, shipments, inventory changes, sales, etc.). The 
processes of economic growth, in particular, also require a flow of information on 
new products artd new means of production. In the distant past, such informa- 
tion was obtained by accident or by trial and error. In recent centuries it has 
become increasingly more intentional and more organized. Technology nowa- 
days is created on purpose, as an explicit economic activity, although this 
activity has not yet been treated as an explicit sector of the economy. 
8. Technology-creation system 
The "technosystem" is, by definition, the creator of new techniques new products 
and new applications. Its activities can and do enable an economy to grow 
beyond the limits set by any given level of technology by finding more efficient 
methods to exploit existing resources, discovering new sources or finding viable 
substitutes, and discovering new products and processes. The technosystem 
operates within the larger economic framework, however. In particular, it is the 
macrosystem that determines both demand for technology and its supply. The 
impressions of certain social critics to the contrary, technology is not an auton- 
omous or self-acting force outside its economic context. 
Similarly, the economic system functions in a social framework, which in 
turn functions in an ecological-biological framework. The latter functions within 
climactic, geochemical, and astrophysical frameworks. The fundamental laws of 
physics (e.g., mechanics and thermodynamics) operate directly or indirectly a t  
all levels of the hierarchy, including the highest. Basic biological laws also 
govern social behavior, and so on. On the other hand, higher-level laws are 
irrelevant a t  lower levels of the hierarchy. 
A debate has raged for many decades over the extent to which technology 
is created in response to exogenously determined demand, vis-A-vis the extent to 
which supply create its own demand - a variant of Say's law in economics. 
Extensive empirical work by economists and sociologists of science tends toward 
the view that perceived demand is by far the dominant factor. That is to say, 
most successful inventors and innovations, and most industrial R&D establish- 
ments, have responded to a clearly articulated need by consumers, government, 
or industry itself. On the other hand, it could be argued that,  occasionally, a 
spectacular technological opportunity comes along before there is any immediate 
need for it. Nuclear power is probably an apt example. The laser, invented in 
the early 1960s, seems to be another. But, in both cases, major future applica- 
tions were immediately obvious - to the point of stimulating continuing R&D 
expenditures. 
Quite apart from the question of primacy of demand versus supply, how- 
ever, it is clear that the economic and political frameworks determine the pattern 
of prices, including wages, and profits that actually govern the existing allocatiori 
of societal resources to, and within, the technosystem. 
The pattern of prices, wages, and profits constitutes a set of signals, 
transmitted by society as a whole (i.e., consumers, government, and industry) 
that guide individual decisions through established market mechanisms. For 
example, enrollment in engineering schools, competing with liberal arts schools, 
apparently reflects relative salaries and job prospects in the different fields. 
Similarly, investors tend to move out of stagnant or unprofitable sectors and into 
more profitable, growing sectors. 
Signals are sometimes confused, as when government interference or 
private collusion distort the operations of the competitive market. In addition, 
there are pervasive market imperfections. Some of these can only be compen- 
sated for by government action. One of these imperfections is the inherent 
difficulty of protecting technological information, which makes it relatively easy 
for imitators and "free ridersn to prosper and inhibits the development of an 
effective market for exchanging technological knowledge in pure form (i.e., not 
embodied in any product). This, in turn, makes it impossible for those who 
invest in new knowledge to capture more than a small fraction of the benefits, in 
most cases. The consequence is to discourage such investment by the private 
sector. 
It follows (ceteris paribus) that the private sector tends to underinvest in 
R&D. The fact that R&D expenditures are nevertheless very high in some 
industries (e.g., electronics and pharmaceuticals) does not contradict this result. 
Quite possibly, the social optimum would be still higher. On the other hand, 
there may be other explanations for the observed facts, since organizational 
behavior in the real world is more complex than the neoclassical model. The 
public sector must make up the gap, particularly in those areas where the 
private incentives are most lacking. One cogent example of such an area is the 
development of technical means for controlling pollutant emissions. Pollution is, 
in itself, a market imperfection, and there is very little profit motive in this field. 
Other areas of minimal private incentive are the mature public sector monopo- 
lies, e.g., defense, public health, and public safety. 
It is axiomatic that technological progress depends on the knowledge base, 
and that the knowledge base can be increased, a t  the margin, by deliberate 
investment in R&D. One question of fundamental interest is why individuals or 
enterprises should invest in R&D. This is tantamount to asking: how and why 
does an R&D investment pay off in economic terms? The general outlines of an 
answer to this question have been clear for some time. Many detailed issues, 
however, still remain to be cleared up. However, in contrast to the case of quasi- 
static economic growth, which is driven by savings and does not depend on 
market structure, there is reason to believe that market structure plays a 
significant role in the process of technology creation. Joseph Schumpeter (1912, 
1961) first pinpointed the driving force underlying dynamic economic growth as 
technological innovation by entrepreneurs seeking "supernormaln profits. Such 
profits arise from a temporary monopoly position conferred by each innovation 
until successful imitators are able to enter the market. Many questions raised by 
Schumpeter's theory remain to be answered, but economists today are increas- 
ingly inclined to accept his basic hypothesis. 
9. Thermodynamic constraints on economic growth 
Several themes from the prior discussion can now be summarized in terms of 
their implications for economic growth: 
I) Since the economy is, by assumption, a dissipative structure, it depends on 
a continuous flow of free energy and materials from and to the environ- 
ment. Such links are precluded by closed neoclassical general equilibrium 
models, either static or quasi-static. 
(2) The energy and physical materials inputs to the economy have shifted over 
the past two centuries from mainly renewable to mainly nonrenewable 
sources. 
(3) Dynamic economic growth is driven by technological change (generated, in 
turn, by economic forces), which also results in continuous structural 
change in the economic system. For instance, so-called Leontief input- 
output coefficients do not remain constant. 
(4 )  It follows, incidentally, that a long-term survival path must sooner or later 
reverse the historical shift away from renewable resources. This will only 
be feasible if human technological capabilities continue to rise to levels 
much higher than current ones [8]. But, since technological capability is 
itself an output of the economic system, it will continue to increase if, and 
only if, deliberate investment in R&D is continued or even increased. 
In short, the role of knowledge-generating activity in retarding global entropy 
seems to be growing in importance. 
Looking a t  it in another way, external resource constraints in themselves 
may not constitute an ultimate limit to growth, since technological improve- 
ments and substitutions appear to offer a possible way out. This has always 
been the basis on which most scientists and economists have criticized the "lim- 
its" thesis of the Club of Rome and others. But the critique itself has tended to 
assume that new technology always appears (essentially) costlessly in response to 
any perceived scarcity or need. This is not the case in reality. Large-scale future 
substitutions, such as the eventual replacement of motor gasoline (perhaps by 
methanol or ethanol) will necessarily entail massive R&D investments for scaling 
up from pilot plants to full-scale production, not to mention even more massive 
capital outlays for construction. But because of market failures, the existing 
private incentives to invest in this kind of research may be inadequate while 
governments may neglect it for short-term political reasons (e.g., "industry 
should do itn). The economic system is not necessarily stable against all pertur- 
bations, and the more it is intentionally managed to optimize growth, the more it 
becomes vulnerable to the consequences of human error. 
A.1. The 20 critical subsystems of a living system. 
Subsystems that process both matter-energy and information 
1. Reproducer carries out instructions in the genetic information or charter of a system 
and mobilizes matter and energy to produce one or more similar systems. 
2. Boundary at  the perimeter of a system holds together the components that make up 
the system, protects them from environmental stresses, and excludes or permits 
entry to various sorts of matter-energy and information. 
Subsystems that process matter-energy Subsystems that process information 
4. Distributor carries inputs from out- 
side the system or outpnts from its 
subsystems around the system to 
each component. 
3. Ingestor brings matter-energy 11. Input transducer, a sensory subsys- 
across the system boundary from tem, brings markers bearing infor- 
the environment. mation into the system, changing 
them to other matter-energy forms 
for transmission within it. 
12. Internal transducer, another sen- 
sory subsystem, receives, from sub- 
systems or components within the 
system, markers bearing informa- 
tion about significant alterations in 
those subsystems or components, 
changing them to other matter- 
energy forms that can be transmit- 
ted within it. 
13. Channel and net are composed of a 
single route in physical space or 
multiple interconnected routes over 
which markers bearing information 
are transmitted to  all parts of the 
system. 
14. Timer,  the clock, set by informa- 
tion from the input transducer 
about states of the environment, 
uses information about processes in 
the system to measure the passage 
of time, and transmits to the 
decider signals that facilitate coor- 
dination of the system's processes 
in time. 
5 .  Converter changes certain inputs 
to the system into forms more use- 
ful for the special processes of that 
particular system. 
6 .  Producer forms stable associations 
that endure for significant periods 
among matter-energy inputs to the 
system or outputs from its con- 
verter, the materials synthesized 
being for growth, damage repair, or 
replacement of components of the 
system, or for providing energy for 
moving or constituting the sys- 
tem's outputs of products or infor- 
mation markers to its suprasystem. 
7. Matter-energy storage places 
matter or energy a t  some location 
in the system, retains it over time, 
and retrieves it. 
8. Eztruder transmits matter-energy 
out of the system in the forms of 
products or wastes. 
9. Motor moves the system or parts of 
it in relation to part or all of its 
environment or moves components 
of its environment in relation to 
each other. 
10. Supporter maintains the proper 
spatial relationships among com- 
ponents of the system, so that they 
can interact without weighting 
each other down or crowding each 
other. 
15. Decoder alters the code of informa- 
tion input to it through the input 
transducer or internal transducer 
into a "~rivate" code that can be 
used internally by the system. 
17.  Memory carries out the second 
stage of the learning process, stor- 
ing information in the system for 
different periods of time, and then 
retrieving it. 
18. Decider, an executive subsystem, 
receives information inputs from 
all other subsystems and transmits 
to them outputs for guidance, coor- 
dination, and control of the sys- 
tem. 
19. Encoder alters the code of informa- 
tion input to it from other 
information-processing subsystems, 
from a "private" code used inter- 
nally by the system into a "public" 
code that  can be interpreted by 
other systems in its environment. 
20. Output transducer emits markers 
bearing information from the sys- 
tem, changing markers within the 
system into other matter-energy 
forms that can be transmitted over 
channels in the system's environ- 
ment. 
*Both sections adapted from Miller (1987). 
A.2. Selected major components of the 20 critical subsystems 
at the three levels of living systems. 
Level 
Subsystem Cell Organ Organism 
1 .  Reproducer DNA and RNA 
molecules 
Matter-energy and 
information: outer 
membrane 
Transport molecules 
Upwardly dispersed 
to organism 
Matter-energy and 
information: cap- 
sule or outer layer 
Input artery 
Testes, ovaries, 
uterus, genitalia 
Matter-energy and 
information: skin or 
other outer covering 
Mouth, nose, skin in 
some species 
Vascular system of 
higher animals 
Upper gastrointesti- 
nal tract 
Organs tha t  syn- 
thesize materials 
for metabolism and 
repair 
Fat ty tissues 
2. Boundary 
3. lngestor 
4.  Distributor Endoplasmic reticu- 
lum 
Enzyme in 
mitochondrion 
Chloroplast in green 
plant 
lntercellular fluid 
5 .  Converter Gastric mucosa cell 
6 .  Producer Islets of Langerhans 
of pancreas 
7 .  Matter-energy 
storage 
8 .  Eztruder 
Adenosine triphos- 
phate 
Central lumen of 
glands 
Contractile vacuoles Output vein Sweat glands of ani- 
mal skin 
Skeletal muscle of 
higher animals 
Skeleton 
Sense organs 
9.  Motor Cilia, flagellae, 
pseudopodia 
Cytoskeleton 
Receptor sites on 
membrane for activ- 
ation of cyclic AMP 
Repressor molecules 
Smooth muscle, car- 
diac muscle 
Stroma 
Receptor cell of 
sense organ 
10. Supporter 
11. Input trans- 
ducer 
12. Internal trans- 
ducer 
Specialized cell of 
sinoatrial node of 
heart 
Proprioceptors 
13. Channel and 
net  
Pathways of mRNA, 
second messengers 
Nerve net or organ Hormonal path- 
ways, central and 
peripheral nerve 
nets 
Supraoptic nuclei of 
thalamus 
Sensory nuclei 
14. Timer  Components not 
known 
Upwardly dispersed 
t o  organism 
15. Decoder Molecular binding 
sites 
Second echelon cell 
of sense organ 
Level 
Subsystem Cell Organ Organism 
16. Association Unknown 
17. Memory 
18. Decider 
19. Encoder 
Unknown 
Regulator genes 
None found; up- 
wardly dispersed to 
organism 
None found; u p  
wardly dispersed to 
organism 
Sympathetic fibers 
of sinoatrial node of 
heart 
Structure that syn- Presynaptic region 
thesizes hormones of output neuron 
20. Output trans- Presynaptic mem- Presynaptic region 
ducer brane of neuron of output neuron 
Unknown neural 
components 
Unknown neural 
components 
Components a t  sev- 
eral echelons of ner- 
vous system 
Temporoparietal 
area of dominant 
hemisphere of human 
cortex 
Larynx; other com- 
ponents that put 
out signals 
Notes 
The objection raised by Thompson had to do with the geological age of the earth. 
Lacking any inkling of the true source of the sun's heat or the earth's interior heat 
(nuclear reactions), physicists calculated a maximum age for the earth to be of the 
order of 25 million years - far too brief to accommodate Darwin's theory of slow 
natural selection. 
Some scientists, including Brillouin (1949), even suggested that the second law of 
thermodynamics might not be applicable in open systems. However, this sort of 
speculation appears unfounded, in view of empirical evidence that biological 
growth processes actually dissipate much more energy than ordinary metabolic 
(maintenance) processes. Prigogine e t  al. (1972) raise the question of "how living 
systems have acquired the ability to dissipate intenselyn. 
Astronomy evolved historically as means of predicting dates of annual spring 
runoff in the Nile Valley, where seasonal changes a t  lower latitudes are very slight. 
Since this paper was written I have become aware that others are thinking along 
similar lines, notably Silverberg (1987a, b) and Dosi e t  a1 (1986). 
In fact. the economic svstem includes a t  least 15 of the 20 characteristic subsvs- 
terns of living systems (Appendiz), lacking only the motor (9), the input trans- 
ducer (11), the encoder (19), and the output transducer (20). The last three sub- 
systems are absent because the ecosystem is unique: it does not interact with 
competitors, predators, prey, etc. 
Aggregative models have been studied by Harrod (1936) and Domar 1956). Sec- 
toral growth models have been studied by von Neumann (1945) and others. The 
literature is well summarized by Burmeister and Dobell (1970). 
Harrod (1936) called this balancing process "walking on the razor's edge". How- 
ever, it  was later shown that the Harrod-Domar models' extreme sensitivity to 
balancing is an artifact of their particular choice of production function (Solow, 
1956). 
An optimal growth model incorporating the information perspective discussed in 
this paper, but focusing on the substitution of renewable resources for exhaustible 
resources, is described in detail in Ayres (1987a). 
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